FOR THE first time in history, the average woman in each of the world’s 15 largest economies is bearing fewer children than are needed to sustain the population over the long term. Some of the world’s largest economies have had low fertility for a long time. Most European countries saw levels fall below the replacement rate (of approximately 2.1 children per woman, depending on mortality rates) in the 1970s. They have not increased above it since.
In Asia, fertility tended to decline later. India only saw a drop to below the replacement rate in 2020; South Korea’s total fertility rate has been below 1.1 children per woman since 2017. It is the lowest in the world. Most of global economic output now comes from low-fertility countries. As of 2020, around 100 countries had a total fertility rate lower than the replacement rate.
Fertility decline has sparked fear among politicians, pundits and investors. They fret over pension systems, health care and economic growth. Even the Pope weighed in earlier this year and said that having pets instead of children was selfish. One should not despair about low fertility, however. Its consequences are less cataclysmic than is frequently assumed.
Take fears about stagnating innovation and productivity as the result of an older workforce. Often such fears are based on inaccurate presumptions about ageing as an inevitable process of decline. In fact, schooling, healthy lifestyles and employment can improve health, cognitive functioning and motivation across the life span and limit reductions in age-related productivity. Predictions that there will be too few young workers to support older retirees are also exaggerated.
What is more, neither high fertility nor a young population guarantees that there will be a favourable balance between productive and dependent members of society. The onset of age-related poor health differs by up to 30 years across countries, and it typically occurs much later in countries with older age structures. When it comes to sustainable welfare systems and strong economies, the health and education of the population can be much more important than age.
Nevertheless, many countries are introducing pro-natal schemes such as child subsidies or a one-time baby bonus in an attempt to boost birth rates. According to the United Nations, 28% of the world’s governments had policies designed to raise fertility in 2019, up from only 9% in 1976. These schemes can improve family life, but often fail to have more than a fleeting effect on the birth rate. This is because they do not address many of the reasons why fewer children are being born.
These include the availability of more effective, long-lasting and less obtrusive contraception; greater reproductive autonomy; more opportunities for women; the cost of raising children; a longer time spent in education; decreased religiosity and more tolerance for diverse family structures and lifestyles. Many people who postpone having children until they are older also underestimate the potential difficulties of conceiving later in life, either naturally or with the support of assisted reproductive technologies.
As populations get older, measures that help people to maintain health, cognitive function and motivation into old age are vital. Governments can boost productivity by investing in health care and education. People should have incentives to work longer, and more efficient schooling should allow people to enter the workforce at an earlier age if they wish to do so. Many countries also need to increase female-workforce participation rates. This is especially important in countries where female labour is underutilised, such as in South Korea or Turkey.
In addition, robots and automation can potentially take over many human tasks and contribute to productivity even as the workforce shrinks. Robots can also reduce the physical demands in many jobs, making it easier for individuals to work at an older age.
Very low fertility can cause fiscal strains and negatively affect economic growth and innovation if generations shrink too quickly. Governments should endeavour to keep fertility above 1.5 children per woman, and avoid a situation where self-reinforcing economic, social and demographic mechanisms keep fertility too low. Fertility is less likely to increase once it falls below two children per woman, and may be even less likely to rebound once it falls below 1.5 children per woman, as seen in Portugal and Italy where only 1.3 children are born per woman.
Still, lower fertility has coincided with vast improvements in reproductive autonomy, gender equality and education over the past few decades. We should embrace the benefits and opportunities it offers. Low fertility means that more resources can be invested in each child and helps minimise our impact on the planet. Moreover, it is time to accept that low fertility is here to stay. We cannot mitigate fertility decline and so we must start adapting to a world with fewer newborns. The question should not be which countries’ populations will age, but which countries’ populations will age well. I believe we can decline and prosper. ■
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Vegard Skirbekk is a professor at the Columbia Ageing Centre at Columbia University in New York and Principal Investigator at the Centre for Fertility and Health in Oslo. He is Author of “Decline and Prosper! Changing Global Birth Rates and the Advantages of Fewer Children” (2022).
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Vegard Skirbekk on why we should embrace low fertility rates - The Economist
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